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Leveraging the Security-Development Nexus in East Africa

by

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During the past fifteen years, the concept of a security-development nexus has gained a lot of attention from theorists and practitioners. Despite a plethora of scholarly work on the subject, American foreign aid does not reflect a purposeful intent to ensure the nexus is maximized to its full potential. Whether it is because those in the field do not accept the nexus' existence or they are unable to consistently define the nexus, America faces a shortcoming that need not exist. The nexus is real and not just theoretical. Opportunities in East Africa, a place of growing interest for America, present policy makers with chances to design foreign aid policies that definitively leverage the mutually beneficial aspects of the nexus. Using the opportunities in East Africa to create such policies can serve as a model for the rest of the foreign aid policy making community. Such change is needed to enhance America's prospects of advancing its national security interests abroad.

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LEVERAGING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN EAST AFRICA

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During the past fifteen years, the concept of a security-development nexus has gained a lot of attention from theorists and practitioners. Despite a plethora of scholarly work on the subject, American foreign aid does not reflect a purposeful intent to ensure the nexus is maximized to its full potential. Whether it is because those in the field do not accept the nexus' existence or they are unable to consistently define the nexus, America faces a shortcoming that need not exist. The nexus is real and not just theoretical. Opportunities in East Africa, a place of growing interest for America, present policy makers with chances to design foreign aid policies that definitively leverage the mutually beneficial aspects of the nexus. Using the opportunities in East Africa to create such policies can serve as a model for the rest of the foreign aid policy making community. Such change is needed to enhance America's prospects of advancing its national security interests abroad.

LEVERAGING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN EAST AFRICA

America is in a state of hypnosis. Many outside the beltway do not know, and/or care, how reckless, though well-intentioned, the Nation spends taxpayers' money. Regardless of the budget line item, carelessness exists and supports habits of duplicative spending on diverse efforts to achieve the same or similar results. This is the case with our foreign aid policy, specifically as it relates to initiatives dealing with human security and societal development. America's foreign aid spending patterns reflect a latent conviction in a separation between security assistance and development assistance. Although Presidents, senior military leaders and Department of State officials have oftentimes professed interdependence between the two, their proclamations are simply rhetoric. America has yet to execute a foreign aid policy that effectively merges these concepts into holistic approaches for advancing national interests. In spite of this shortcoming, this paper contends: (1) the linkage between security and development is more than just theoretical and, (2) American policy makers should consistently leverage this nexus to craft coherent, integrated foreign aid policies. In support of these claims, a first step is to define the security-development nexus in order to pinpoint linkages from which foreign aid policies can be crafted. After establishing an understanding of the nexus, follow-on steps require examples of disjointedness in US foreign aid and national security spending to identify missed opportunities for coherent, integrated foreign aid policies. Due to the breadth and varying aspects of America's security assistance and development spending, this work will focus on the potential benefits from leveraging the nexus to conduct security-driven interventions in the economic and development affairs of select East African nations.

The specific East African nations are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. These nations play prominent roles in enabling the United States' achievement of its national security interests in the Horn of Africa. These interests can be best served if the US creates security-oriented initiatives that simultaneously contribute to development efforts within those countries. This approach is appropriate for East Africa because of the region's volatility. If Africa is considered the "world's soft underbelly for global terrorism,"[1] East Africa should be considered the belly button. The instability that currently embroils Somalia creates conditions conductive for bad actors. This permissive environment may undermine the stability of Somalia's bordering neighbors- Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya and foster conditions with negative repercussions for the entire region. Such instability could threaten America's security half a world away. America needs stability in the region to protect its interests and that stability is achievable in the areas of security and development. As indicated earlier, the starting point is defining exactly what is meant by a security-development nexus.

The Security-Development Nexus

To fully appreciate the scope of this concept, two questions require answers: "what is meant by *security?*" and "what is meant by *development?"* Answering these questions facilitates one's ability to grasp the theoretical underpinnings of the security-development nexus.

Generally speaking, 'security' is a sense of predictability at different levels of one's social system.[2] Some scholarly definitions explain security as the safekeeping of a nation's territorial integrity, and vital interests, via political, legal or military elements of national power.[3] Within the past two decades, security has been redefined to encompass not only nation-states, but the people within the nation-states as well.

Accompanying this broadening perspective was the acceptance of the notion that security entails more than just threats (and acts of) of violence. From this new outlook, non-military threats such as transnational crime, population movements and governmental corruption became additional considerations for defining security. Economic volatility and social concerns such as welfare, employment and the distribution of national wealth also became part of the calculus.[4] Today, human security, in the broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring each individual has opportunities and choices to reach his or her potential.[5] The United Nations (UN) initiative to eradicate poverty via its Millennium Development Goals initiated the new way security practitioners have come to define security. In broad terms, security now refers to a state's (or person's) insulation from violent conflicts that originate from states, non-state actors, or deficient structural socio-economic conditions.[6]

On the other hand, development is casually regarded as societal activities designed to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living. Key aspects of development include socio-economic growth, access to health care, education and infrastructure improvements.[7] Development is more than a simple amalgamation of the determinants of Gross Domestic Product. It is a broad concept that integrates varied psychological and material factors related to humans' well-being. Although once measured primarily with economic indicators, those in the development field changed their paradigms when the UN Development Program offered an expansive definition of development in its 1990 *Human Development Report*. This report suggested

development revolves around people and consists of two aspects- human capabilities and how people used those capabilities. Human capabilities included improved health, knowledge and skills and the manner in which they could utilize those capabilities within the areas of leisure, productivity or social/political action.[8] Whether using development's traditional definitions or the nuanced ones, the concept connotes forward progress. This nebulous characteristic may be a major factor in the difficulty in deliberately integrating security and development policies in a coherent manner. The things that differentiate societies from one another cannot be influenced by external actors with realistic expectations of achieving the same results time after time. Therefore, the implied points of connectivity between security and development are elusive because what works in one place may not work in another. Notwithstanding this potential disconnect, practitioners still seek ways to take advantage of opportunities to implement beneficial programs under the concept of a security-development nexus.

Given these definitions, security and development seem to intuitively go together. For years, academics have consistently argued a linkage between the two mutually reinforcing concepts.[9] Proponents' circular type of reasoning argues development is ultimately impossible without security and, conversely, sustainable security fails without development. Prominent individuals argue the interdependence is most evident in the area of health care accessibility. Although overlap frequently exists in this area, the impact from lack of economic opportunities also conveys a compelling case in support of a tangible connection between the two. This work is based on the premise of the latter school of thought. The convergence of these concepts create interesting policy and political implications which have yet to be boldly resolved in ways promoting

coherence with America's foreign aid policies.[10] Despite the expansive literature on the subject, few authors have endeavored to clearly define the precise nature of this connection.[11] The growth of research in this area implies assumptions about the links are based on minimal evidence of causation. The lack of any clear relationship hints the nexus relies more on rhetorical claims than on considered policy-making.[12] The strength of various works on these topics comes from the mere fact that the authors explicitly acknowledge a connection between the two concepts and consistently propose a more deliberateness in making policies built upon the nexus of the two when it comes to policy making. Encouragement of this type has endured since the end of the Cold War and has gained advocates since the September 2001 attacks. In defense of policy makers, crafting policy to deliberately leverage inherent linkages between security and development is hard. Most likely, the difficulty arises from the broad meanings of the respective concepts.

For example, the world has seen numerous peace-keeping missions with multi-faceted aspects designed at not only assuring the peace, but of transforming the local political-social landscapes as well. Evidence of this 'square peg in a round hole' mentality is also found amongst development practitioners. Commendable activities under the umbrella of public sector, security sector and judicial reforms reflect a keen interest in manipulating relational factors between the nature of unpredictable conflict and the mechanics of deliberate social development planning.[13] In most instances, these efforts have produced meaningful results. However, they are basically just individual initiatives that effectively applied security and development programming, to unique conditions on the ground. Any resulting nexus between security and

development occurred more by chance than by any deliberate effort. This condition gives rise to a wellspring of criticisms concerning any type of tangible security-development nexus.

A common counterargument to a security-development nexus suggests the pairing militarizes American foreign aid policy and breeds confusion and incoherence in policy making.[14] This insinuation reflects an appeal to paranoia as it paints America as a nation-state secretly obsessed with evolving into an imperial power. This idea is anathema to the ideals on which this nation was founded. Albeit, there may be merit in the critique concerning confusion and incoherence, this criticism could be easily levied against any government policy. Another criticism asserts the absence of a nexus because of the existence of few, if any, successful examples of strategies targeted at the proximate sources of conflict through a deliberate merger of security and development policies.[15] These opponents further hold the scant evidence in existence is nothing more than a smattering of disparate efforts lacking any coherent policy framework.[16] In other words, efforts under the guise of a security-development nexus are basically socially engineered ‘drive-bys’ with no logically ordered methodology for achieving and sustaining results through a deliberate merger of security and development concepts. Effectively rebutting this position relies on a proposition that minimal proof of existence does not definitively prove the non-existence of something. The lack of documentation could be the result of policy maker laziness and/or an inability to document due to routine attrition in the bureaucracy. Other arguments come from classical liberalism adherents who propose any deliberate effort to link the two, even when national security is at stake, detrimentally impacts peace and order in the

target nation-state or region.[17] This negative impact allegedly arises from the potential of developmental assistance to lessen expectations of recipient governments to sustain conditions conducive to private enterprise. When this occurs, the argument goes, the impetus for growth and self-reliance disappear, as do the prospects for successful economic development in the respective nation.[18] The alleged results could emerge because of the uniqueness of societies, as referenced earlier. Since conditions on the ground vary between locations, as well as the corresponding policy outcomes, there may be a tendency for practitioners to either deliberately, or inadvertently, overlook internal and/or regional enablers that will shape the scope of the eventual policy outcome. In other words, the interdependence of security and development is context-specific and is resistant to universal, antidotes.[19] Notwithstanding these arguments, this author recognizes a security-development nexus and insists the field is closer than it appears to the emergence of coherent policy that deliberately and consistently links the two.

The true nexus is found in the *implementation* of security and development assistance activities. In most instances with foreign aid assistance, there is usually a sole area of concern to be manipulated via the application of aid. This area of concern must be addressed in certain ways in order to produce anticipated outcomes with mutual benefits to donor and recipient. In the security and development domains, the same area of concern can be the focus of both, without a danger of producing results that only satisfy the objectives of one domain. In the nexus, the primary, secondary and/or tertiary effects are also beneficial to the other domain and can be further manipulated to achieve portions of the domain's objectives that were not fully achieved

through the primary effort. Each domain can independently capitalize on the residual benefits of the other. The challenge, or opportunities, for policy makers is to diligently seek out those shared areas of concern and design foreign aid policies around those commonalities.

Although achieving such results remains the holy grail of security-development policy making, practitioners press on and their motivation is provided by today's strategic leaders. The United States (US) 2011 National Military Strategy's declaration that our security and prosperity are inseparable,[20] reflect an American acceptance of the notion of a linkage between security and development. This assertion should not be defined as exclusive to America and her interests, as evidenced by the United Nations' Secretary-General's contention that "a more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop."[21] Despite the statement's idealistic tone, it contains logic worthy of examination.

Past Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 'real chance to develop' references the conventional wisdom behind these spheres- that security enables meaningful development. Well what exactly does a real chance to develop mean? According to existing literature, a real chance to develop exists when businesses and citizens possess a sense of safety and predictability regarding a nation's political and social environment. When these two groups achieve that assurance, a widespread belief that financial investments will facilitate economic development and job creation ensues throughout the nation.[22] This occurrence will occur, and continue, as long as a sense of security exists amongst businesses and citizens. A secure environment within a nation sets the conditions for effective development. This reflects a logical conclusion that has

permeated the field. It remains in vogue in many circles and serves as attractive substance from which strategic leaders can set strategic direction for their globally connected countries and institutions.

It is the proclamation from various US strategic documents and observations from officials like the Secretary-General, which gives credence to the concept of a tangible link between security and development. Exhortations that bring attention to security and development's casual connections are insightful and helpful to the emergence of coherent policymaking processes that deliberately link security to development. Strategic leaders' prodding reflects brilliant prudence, for it facilitates creation of an organizational climate primed for change. Additionally, such advocacy shows deft political maneuvering, for it speaks to the existence of common ground. Once opposing sides recognize common ground, organizational change is possible. Organizational change is required to enable new business practices capable of producing effective and fiscally sound foreign aid policies. Although the concept of common ground prepares the mind for pending change, in government circles, it also births apprehension. Where commonalities exist, so do redundancies. The proverbial "elephant in the room" of the security-development nexus debate is the competition amongst resources. Between the two camps, practitioners are probably using more resources than necessary, or leveraging like type processes to arrive at the same or similar results. It is the quest for efficiencies throughout the federal government that will usher in an era where the design of foreign aid policies is consistently done with the deliberate purpose of linking security and development objectives. Getting to such a position is a huge undertaking considering the magnitude of American security and

development initiatives. As such, it would be practical to first develop and implement a model to determine the feasibility of widespread implementation across America's broad involvement throughout the world. This work recommends such a model be developed and tested on America's foreign aid practices in East Africa.

This region of the world has important implications on American security and is beginning to garner more interest as American winds down its involvement in Afghanistan. Properly analyzing this recommendation's merits requires an appreciation for the context from which a model would be developed. A basic understanding of American foreign aid in Africa aids in obtaining a good contextual appreciation.

US Foreign Aid in Africa

Many historians regard the Marshall Plan as the starting point of US foreign aid as an institution. The plan is considered, by some, as the harbinger for the security-development nexus because it was a deliberate use of foreign aid to advance national security interests.[23] Through the years, American foreign aid evolved into a comprehensive program with three distinct pillars of assistance: disaster relief & humanitarian; development, and; security.[24]

Humanitarian assistance focuses on providing aid in response to crisis and disasters- both man-made and natural. A component of this aid type is long-term assistance designed to reduce poverty, hunger and other forms of human suffering.[25] The development pillar focuses on ways to promote American exports and the creation of new customers for US products.[26] The last pillar consists of programs motivated by national security interests and involves activities that: combat violent threats; promote peacekeeping initiatives; maintain US access to foreign countries, and; counter transnational threats. On the surface, it appears security-related programs are distinct

from programming found in the other two pillars, but in essence, there are no discernible differences. Since the passage of the Foreign Aid Assistance Act of 1961 (the Act), US policy makers have attempted to leverage the Act's provisions to provide assistance for foreign economic development as a way of enhancing American security.[27] As such, America's security assistance programs are not markedly different than those of the other pillars,[28]and in some cases could be regarded as redundant. The implementation strategy for the Act guided America's support for anti-communist governments during the Cold War and has influenced America's foreign aid engagements since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Examples of this are prominent throughout Africa. United States aid to the continent reached a peaked in 1985, fell off at the end of the Cold War, and resurged after 2001.[29] In recent years, US aid to Africa has more than quadrupled from $1.1 billion to $8.2 billion between October 2005 and September 2009.[30] However, the majority of that aid was devoted to health-related issues. Although important, health-related programs in Africa do not provide the impactful, long-term type of security-related results beneficial to American security interests. For example, it is difficult to ascertain the precise linkages between the hugely successful President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) initiative and American security interests to keep parts of Africa from evolving into safe havens for violent extremists.

As revealed earlier, certain health issues (like accessibility to effective health care) touch upon both security and developmental implications. One could logically argue healthy people are less likely to use health care accessibility as a grievance against their governments. The inability to use this as a complaint could be interpreted as a contributing factor to a nation's stability (provided the country is experiencing

stability). From a development angle, one could persuasively assert healthy people can, and will, work, thus ultimately contributing to a nation's economic development. With no regard to these positions' strengths (or lack of), they represent a way to leverage possible linkages between the security and development domains. Conversely, another "way," with the potential for a more measureable and enduring impact, is the manipulation of the security-development nexus in ways addressing root causes that helped categorize this part of the world as an area of concern for America. It is time for America to do things differently regarding the types of aid sent to Africa, especially in areas that could produce challenges to American security interests.

As America begins to pay more attention to the Pacific / Far East region, policy makers must not overlook strategic blind spots. East Africa is a potential strategic blind spot warranting persistent attention. A plethora of porous borders, weak law enforcement and security institutions and disaffected citizenry have made several East African nations increasingly appealing as safe havens for global terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and its affiliates.[31] The most prominent example of this occurrence manifests itself in the east African nation of Somalia. Somalia's instability, coupled with the active presence of the extremist organization al Shabaab is a primary reason why US Africa Command's General Carter Ham designates East Africa as his top priority.[32] As the world's most prominent failed state, Somalia has recently ranked first in frequency and intensity of terrorist events.[33] A long-time ally, Uganda, is beleaguered from its decades-long struggle against the Lord's Resistance Army, and South Sudan faces an onerous task of creating a nation from scratch in the midst of a hostile Sudan not interested in abiding by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The situations in

these three nations serve as a potential source of prolonged instability in the region and threaten domestic and Western interests. The presumed threat is not just seen from an American point of view, as African officials have come to similar conclusions. In a speech to the ministers of justice from select East African nations, the Executive Secretary of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) asserted: East Africa's location (in regard to the Arabian Peninsula); the persistence of conflict; despair resulting from the loss of hope, and; growth in extremism, make Eastern Africa a breeding ground for terrorist activity.[34]

In response to this danger, America proactively provides assistance to the area. With this assistance, select East African security forces are receiving training in conducting counter-terrorism activities and nations are receiving equipment to assist in the global struggle against violent extremism. The amount of dollars poured into the region is impressive; however, a cursory look at the way America disperses the aid leads one to conclude that, in most instances, money is awarded just to satisfy some initiative tangentially related to violent extremism. If there was a defined "method to the madness" of American foreign aid policy in East Africa, one could easily look at America's spending patterns and see that the assistance is directed towards a specific end. The way a government disburses its assistance funds should provide indications of a desired end state. Referencing health-related development assistance, it is obvious an American goal in Africa is to significantly reduce the incidents of AIDS through PEPFAR. A similar analysis of security assistance spending, in any part of Africa, fails to yield such clarity. The problems contributing to this situation are probably varied, but one prominent problem is American aid is not shaped by an effective interagency

process that balances the priorities and desired end states of the most prominent stakeholders in the area, namely US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DoD).

Both pursue laudable and needed projects; but too frequently, things put into place are neither related nor coordinated with one another and they should be to get the most bang out of a rapidly shrinking buck. East Africa is a vivid example of how America is missing the mark in leveraging the synergy between the security and development domains. Given today's global economic situation, America's downplayed competition with China on the continent, and a scaled-back defense strategy, now is the time for America to do something different in that part of Africa.

Advancing American Interests in East Africa

If security assistance practitioners were to look for new ways of doing things in East Africa, they would be unable to overlook perennially present socio-economic factor that has persistently existed in the region- poverty. This unfortunate and debilitating condition provides security assistance planners with regional development opportunities that can be effectively addressed through deliberate attempts to promote regional security through well thought out security assistance funding. In other words, poverty is the development condition America seeks to impact and lessening the extremism threat is the security condition capturing America's attention. One way to address both conditions in a mutually beneficial manner is through infrastructure improvements- specifically roads. Roads improvement and maintenance, inclusive of related security and development implications, represent a prominent security-development nexus currently existing in East Africa. America must strategically leverage this nexus to its long-term advantage.

As expressed in various strategic documents, America's biggest concern in East Africa is the security capabilities amongst key nation-states, in particular, Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. It is in the US' best interest that these nations possess a strong capacity (and willingness) to secure their borders and protect their people from conventional and unconventional attacks. This could be accomplished by enhancing the rapid deployment capacities of these three nations. Both Kenya and Ethiopia have a keen appreciation for this capability as al Shabaab's presence is a threat to both nations. Kenya recently validated the importance of having a strong rapid deployment capability. The Kenyan Defense Force's October 2011 excursion into south Somalia to engage al Shabaab [35] showcased a military capability that needs to be replicated in other countries in the area. The ability of a nation's security forces to quickly deploy from place to place has significant security implications as it enables the nation's forces to confront external threats and/or protect the citizens within its borders. Although Ethiopia and Kenya have this capability, it is hampered by both countries' road infrastructure. These nations' forces cannot get to everywhere, thus leading to ungoverned spaces. Regarding the dangers of ungoverned spaces, many developing states are unable to project a government presence in remote areas due to the difficulty in getting to those areas. In the absence of government visibility or influence, the void is susceptible to bad actor infiltrations. Improving the road networks can help mitigate this threat and improve the rapid deployment capability of the host nation. Good roads facilitate a government's efforts to protect/defend their borders and provide essential services to citizens who live in the vast, ungoverned spaces that are most vulnerable to extremist infiltration.[36] Once the roads are improved, the US can offer continued

security assistance in operations covering: border control, traffic control, rapid deployment, supply and road maintenance. These are examples of how security assistance targeting improvement of roads can lead to security assistance activities that contribute to the attainment of three of four national military objectives in East Africa. Those objectives, as identified in the 2011 National Military Strategy, are: counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, and strengthen international and regional security.[37] The end result would be enhancements in partner nations' and American security. Just as these areas offer tangible security-related benefits, there are also viable and promising development-related benefits with potential of enduring impact in the region. It is important to recognize that improving the road networks should not be a stand-alone objective. A complementary and very important piece to this focus is road maintenance. Without good and consistent maintenance, this proposed investment in roads improvement would be wasted by the eventual need to rebuild roads that have fallen into disrepair. Foreign assistance aid should be inclusive of resources required to build/improve roads and to maintain them for an extended period of time.

From the perspective of the security-development nexus, road maintenance beneficially impacts security and development. Security-wise, maintenance activities help to preserve a critical enabler of military capacities. In East Africa, those are the rapid deployment capabilities of the affected countries. When nations retain the ability to leverage these capacities, the region is more secure. A residual effect is the protection of American interests in the region. Aside from the security-related benefits

referenced earlier, road maintenance also contributes negatively or positively to determinants of economic development in a region.

Poor roads accelerate vehicles' wear and tear and increase maintenance and operating costs to business owners. These increased costs can limit companies' growth potential and negatively contribute to economic development efforts in a region. Conversely, good roads enable lower operating costs and positively contribute to such efforts. Additionally, aid with roads maintenance element has the potential for creating new services within the recipient nation. With a consistent emphasis on road maintenance there may be a need for businesses to either start, or expand, in an effort to help the governments maintain their roads. The economic benefits derived from roads maintenance activities are measureable impacts that can evolve from foreign aid specifically intended for road maintenance. Additional economic-related gains could be realized by roads' ability to link people with goods and services.

The development potential surrounding improved road networks is based on the impact the Eisenhower Interstate System had on America's economy. America's highway system: helped reduce freight costs; made affordable land more accessible, and; fostered the creation of a national domestic market to whom companies could cheaply supply their products.[38] In addition to the economic benefits that America reaped, and continues to enjoy, the highway system also had a positive impact on national defense. Notwithstanding the potential economic benefits that planners may have anticipated, one of the main reasons why America built an interstate highway system was to support national defense. In the early years of the Cold War, strategists foresaw a security need for an efficient transportation network that could move large

amounts of military personnel and huge quantities of military equipment and supplies.[39] These kinds of results are the types of tangible measures that America's development assistance could strive for in East Africa. Adopting such an approach can effectively address an enduring shortcoming which has plagued the Horn of Africa for decades- a poor regional transportation network responsible for limited growth and trade expansion.[40] American development assistance should not seek to build a road infrastructure on par with America's superhighway system. Using America's highway system as a comparison is not to imply the same type of results will occur for each nation receiving developmental assistance for roads improvement. The comparison is made to convey a real life example of how a development type of activity provided long-term economic development benefits and simultaneous national defense benefits. In this context, America's development assistance should strategically invest in on-going and planned projects seeking to enhance critical transportation corridors in various parts of East Africa. There exist two potential opportunities satisfying this criteria.

One opportunity exists with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). As a program of the African Union (AU), NEPAD, provides opportunities for African countries to take ownership of development within their borders and to work more closely and effectively with international partners.[41] It is within NEPAD's program area of regional integration and infrastructure where the US can direct developmental assistance as part of a deliberate effort to leverage the security-development nexus. In this area, NEPAD has two planned projects worthy of consideration. One is a project to construct a 272 mile road corridor starting in Mobassa, Kenya, travelling through Nairobi, Kenya, and ending in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The other project is smaller in

scope. It entails upgrading 45 miles of the existing road between Djibouti City, Djibouti and Addis Ababa.[42] Another opportunity resides in the Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI).

The HOAI is a peace and security strategy jointly executed by the IGAD and the European Union. One of the strategy's premier efforts is the Ring Corridor Project. This long-term project seeks to link the major ports and trading hubs of the respective IGAD members (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda).[43] Providing development assistance to either of these pan-African organizations will make meaningful contributions to efforts to address issues with security and development issues.

From the development side of the house, the project aims to promote the governments' abilities to effectively connect people to market economies and government services, including, but not limited to health care. Looking at the downstream effects that could come from providing assistance for roads improvement and maintenance, it appears, a possibility exists to deliberately link security and development efforts. Theory leads many to asses this as an easy thing to do; however, to date, America lacks successes to validate this assertion. The fault behind this shortcoming is due to African nations' internal issues and issues with American foreign aid policies. The African issues revolve around the absence of some pre-requisite conditions. Those conditions include: strong nations with governments capable of protecting borders, exercising control of territory, possessing a monopoly on the use of force and providing security to its citizens. With a long history of corruption and civil unrest in the region, willing partners have been few and far apart.

Several reasons exist to explain America's inability to leverage its security activities to promote development within African partner nations. One reason, as mentioned earlier, is the inefficient interagency process.[44] Another reason is American planners have either refused or been unable to make definitive linkages between security and development policies. American policy makers have failed to adhere to the 2006 National Security Strategy and design and implement development programs that build stable, prosperous and peaceful societies that inevitably contribute to reducing long term threats to our national security.[45] Dedicating development and assistance funding for road infrastructure improvements and maintenance in East Africa can overcome the past deficiencies and serve as a practical model for other areas of American foreign aid policies that could maximize inherent linkages between development and security opportunities.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis of possibilities presents policy makers a framework for implementing security and developmental assistance in a manner that maximizes efficiencies by a deliberate merger of similar objectives in the two domains. The focus on American foreign aid policy in East Africa enables a proposal for specific ways American policy makers could identify and leverage connections between security assistance and development assistance activities. In this context, critical and creative thinking, coupled with unique regional conditions, identified a credible security-development nexus centering on roads improvement and maintenance. This discovery provides the foundation from which policy makers could develop a testable model. Although this work conceded a security-development nexus in the area of health care, it also indicated a more prominent connection existed in the area of poverty.

Notwithstanding this admission, this work does not recommend increasing security assistance funding in East Africa at the expense of health-related development assistance. Potential funding sources exist through the federal budget. After America extricates itself from Afghanistan, for example, adjustments to America's official development assistance account should be able to accommodate modest increases in security assistance spending for East Africa.

This proposed change is based on a contention that a security and development nexus exists and that it is not purely theoretical, but concrete. This work expounded on this contention and asserted the nexus is most easily found in the *implementation* of security and development assistance activities and not the coincidental nature of the domains' similar aspects. To leverage this nexus, security and development practitioners must identify similar areas of concern that could be addressed through deliberately focused and collaborative efforts to define mutually reinforcing objectives to facilitate consistent successes.

To date, US security and development assistance efforts have achieved mutually beneficial successes due more to chance than by policy makers' deliberate efforts to achieve those results. Although the Nation has benefited, America could further benefit by consistent efforts to purposefully find and capitalize on linkages existing between various security and development opportunities.

Policy makers must go beyond a superficial recognition of the concepts' mutually reinforcing nature. They must aggressively look for those linkages and construct policies around those linkages. American history gives cause to assert the linkages between security and development are more than just theoretical, and real life

opportunities provide motivation to justify those claims. From the Marshal Plan to varied counterterrorism initiatives, the existence of exploitable connections between security assistance and developmental assistance is obvious. Regardless of the location, high probabilities of connections always exist. Since every nation and region is different, the connections will not be the same in all instances, and the resulting types of security-development assistance will differ, since it will be based on the needs of that particular situation. The obstacles to capitalizing on this potential are primarily man-made; and therefore, susceptible to man-made solutions. The most cost-effective and easiest solution is just to do it. It simply boils down to policy makers locating the linkages and purposefully collaborating with one another in ways that seek coherence and unity of effort. Accomplishing this depends on the critical and creative thinking skills of authors and executors of American security and development assistance policies. In this age of declining resources, the Nation's best interests are served if USAID and DOD policy makers sit down and determine security and development linkages to design policies which reduce redundancies through policies that seek the same objective(s) or seek to achieve end states that are complementary to one another.

Despite some critics' claims, adopting this new way of doing business will not militarize American foreign aid policy, nor create an unsustainable dependency on aid in a recipient nation. The dual benefits resulting from assistance from a security-development-nexus inspired should demonstrate that neither security, nor development, benefits at the expense of the other. Protestations that this will always be the case, sustain a tension in the foreign aid policy community which has, to date, hindered policy makers' abilities to deliberately leverage concrete linkages between security and

development to implement foreign aid policies that efficiently and cost-effectively advance American interests abroad.

The prescription offered in this work neither eliminates the inefficient use of taxpayers' dollars, nor promises to turn a disinterested populace curious. The assertion of a bona fide nexus between security and development is important to the future of both domains. With shrinking budgets, the US cannot afford to stop security and development assistance spending. To keep both and maximize their respective and collective potential, practitioners must identify efficiencies between the two and put an end to the existence of parallel foci. Policies that merge various aspects of these domains will not detrimentally impact the efficiency of either. This paper's mantra of deliberately developing security-motivated assistance policies with potential development and security benefits is an attempt to encourage fiscal accountability and efficiency. This goal is, invariably, what policy makers are implicitly tasked to do, because America will not come out of its hypnosis at the count of three.

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